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COMMON LAW LIABILITY OF LIQUOR VENDORS
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, District Judge Jameson of the United States District
Court, District of Montana, decided the case of Deeds v. United States.'
The case presented to the court the question: "[I]s there a right of
action under Montana law against the person selling or furnishing in-
toxicating liquor to a minor or intoxicated person in favor of a person
injured by the intoxicated person as a consequence of his intoxication? 1 2
On the facts presented by Deeds, Judge Jameson answered the question
in the affirmative, concluding that the plaintiff was entitled to recover
damages from the vendor of the intoxicants.
The successful plaintiff, Sandra Deeds, had been injured in an auto-
mobile accident. She had been a passenger in an automobile driven
by Gerald Tanberg, who prior to the accident had been served intox-
icating liquors by employees of the defendant United States. The serving
was violative of Montana law3 in that Tanberg was a minor and sales were
made or liquor was given to him after he became intoxicated. The court
concluded that this violation of law constituted negligence, 4 and that
it was a proximate cause of the accident and resulting injuries to the
plaintiff. 5
To the extent that the holding of Deeds represents Montana law,
Montana is aligned with a minority of jurisdictions sustaining a liquor
vendor's common law6 liability to a third person injured by the vendor's
patron. But to characterize the Deeds holding as the minority approach,
is to stop short. Deeds is representative of a handful of recently de-
cided cases that seem to evince a nascent trend reversing the present
'Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
Deeds].
2Id. at 354.
'R.C.M.1947 § 4-413. This section reads in pertinent part:
No licensee or his or her employee or employees, nor any other person, shall
sell, deliver, or give away or cause or permit to be sold, delivered or given away any
liquor, beer or wine to:
1. Any person under the age of twenty-one (21) years.




'It should be noted that although the common law rule generally denies recovery against
the vendor, many states have enacted statutes granting a right of action, to persons
injured by an intoxicated person, against the person selling the liquor which caused
the intoxication. These statutes, usually denominated as either a Civil Damage Act
or a Dram Shop Act, are not in any sense common law negligence actions but rather
they confer new, separate and distinct rights of action. 45 Am. JUR 2d Intoxicating
Liquors § 561 (1969). Ogilvie lists twenty-one states having dram shop acts in 1958.
Ogilvie, History and Appraisal of the Illinois Dram Shop Act, 1958 U. Ill. L.F. 175.
A somewhat perfunctory research would indicate that the number has remained un-
changed.
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majority rule insulating the vendor. The compass of this Note shall in-
clude a statement of the majority common law rule, a recapitulation
of the cases seeming to establish a trend allowing recovery, and a dis-
cussion of Deeds.
II. GENERAL COMMON LAW RULE DENYING CAUSE OF AC-
TION
At common law the majority rule is that a vendor of intoxicating
liquor is not liable to a third person for injury or damage sustained
by the third person resulting from the intoxication of the vendor's
patron, 7 nor is the vendor liable to the intoxicated patron who has,
because of his intoxication, injured himself.8 Simply stated the com-
mon law rule is that it is not a tort to sell or give intoxicating liquor
to the ordinary able-bodied man.9 In protecting the liquor vendor many
courts go beyond this "able-bodied" or "competent man" statement of
the rule. In the California case of Hitson v. Dwyer,10 for example, plain-
tiff patron fell from a stool in defendant's bar after defendant had
served, to the obviously intoxicated plaintiff, liquor in violation of statute
which prohibited the selling, furnishing, or giving of any alcoholic
beverage to any obviously intoxicated person. The court found for the
defendant, reasoning that it was not the sale of the liquor, but rather
the consumption of it which was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries.
The rationale expressed in Hitson is the one usually given for the
holding of non-liability in these cases; that is, the wrongful sale of
the liquor is not the proximate cause of the injury, but rather it is
'See generally Aanot., 75 A.L.R.2d 833 (1961), for a discussion of the common law
right of action for damages sustained by a third party plaintiff in consequence of
sale or gift of intoxicating liquor or habit forming drugs to another. Cases holding,
recognizing, or illustrating the majority rule of the vendor's non-liability include:
Cherbonnier v. Rafalovich, 88 F. Supp. 900 (D. Alaska 1950); Collier v. Stamatis, 63
Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App.2d 246, 210 P.2d
530 (1949); Noonan v. Galick, 19 Conn. Supp. 308, 112 A.2d 892 (1955); Henry
Grady Hotel Co. v. Sturgis, 70 Ga. App. 379, 28 S.E.2d 329 (1943); Howlett v. Doglio,
402 Ill. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708 (1949); Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 92 N.W.2d
682 (1958) ; Stringer v. Calmes, 167 Kan. 278, 205 P.2d 921 (1949); State for the
use of Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951) ; Barboza v. Decas, 311
Mass. 10, 40 N.E.2d 10 (1942); Beck v. Groe, 245' Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886, 52
A.L.R.2d 875 (1955); Tarwater v. Atlantic Co., 176 Tenn. 510, 144 S.W.2d 746 (194a).
8See generally Amnot., 54 A.L.R.2d 1152 (1957), for the common law liability of per-
sons furnishing intoxicating liquor for injury or. death of the consumer. Although
Deeds does not raise the issue of a consumer's right to a cause of action against the
vendor, the issue has sufficient connection to the one presented by Deeds that it will
also be discussed under part III of this Note, THE TREND TOWARD AVAIL-
ABILITY OF REMEDY AGAINST THE VENDOR.
'Kingen v. Weyant, 148 Cal. App.2d 656, 307 P.2d 369 (1957); Howlett v. Doglio,
402 Ill. 311, 83 N.W.2d 708 (1949); Manthei v. Heimerdinger, 332 Ill. App. 335,
75 N.E.2d 132 (1947).
"Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App.2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (1943).
[Vol. 31
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the voluntary consumption which is the proximate cause.'1 Some courts
go further finding the sale even more remote. In Collier v. Stamatis,
12
for example, the defendant tavern keeper sold a drink of highly intoxi-
cating liquor to a child fifteen years of age. The child became intoxicated
and was held in detention by officers of the law as a juvenile delinquent.
The child's mother was deprived of her daughter's services, and her
prayer was for both compensatory and punitive damages. The court
found that the sale was clearly unlawful and therefore negligence per
se, yet it held that the complaint did not state a cause of action. It held
as it did reasoning not only was the sale not the proximate cause of
the injury, but it was not even the proximate cause of the child's in-
toxication.
[I]n the imbibing of alcoholic drink the proximate cause of the
resultant intoxication is the voluntary, independent, uncoerced, unin-
vited self-indulgence of him who knowing the difference between
right and wrong and the injurious effects apt to follow yet holds
the cup to his own lips and drinks."
Where the patron himself is the plaintiff, the vendor usually has the
defense of contributory negligence.' 4 Furthermore, the contributory negli-
gence of the decedent bars recovery by his heirs or next of kin in a
wrongful death action.' 5
At least one court 16 has expressed the view that having once had a
Dram Shop Act which provided for a cause of action against the vendor,
upon repeal of that Act, it would fly in the face of logic to judicially
accord a cause of action against the liquor vendor.' 7
uId., Henry Grady Hotel Co. v. Sturgis, 70 Ga. App. 379, 28 S.E.2d 329 (1943);
Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App.2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949); Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal.2d
345, 289 P.2d 450, 54 A.L.R.2d 1137 (1955); Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 226
A.2d 383 (1967).
163 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945).
'$Id. at 162 P.2d 128.
"Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal.2d 345, 289 P.2d 450, 54 A.L.R.2d 1137 (1955); Noonan v. Galick,
19 Conn. Supp. 308, 112 A.2d 892 (1955); Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d
900 (1965). Contra, Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958).
'"Contra, Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966) (contributory
negligence of deceased not a bar in suit by widow for wrongful death where widow
not charged with contributory negligence). See the discussion of Soronen in the text
accompanying notes 44 and 74, infra.
"Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54, 58 (1969) (by implication). But
where Pennsylvania formerly had a Dram Shop Act which it had repealed, the Penn-
sylvania court held the plaintiff did state a cause of action at common law where
the complaint alleged the vendor had unlawfully sold intoxicating liquor to the visibly
intoxicated patron plaintiff, who was subsequently injured in an attack by another
patron. Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958). Schelin is
discussed in the text accompanying note 25, infra. See also Rappaport v. Nichols,
31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1, 75 A.L.R.2d 821 (1959) which is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 28-32, infra.
17It can be argued that such a position is without valid support. In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, it might well be that the Act was repealed because the
remedy it provided, in the minds of the majority of the legislators, was not compre-
hensive enough; or perhaps it, coupled with a statute permitting recovery for wrongful
death, permitted a double recovery in some instances and the legislators wanted to
cure this defect . . . . The point is, there could be any number of reasons for the
repeal of the Act. Without evidence as to why an Act is repealed, it is anomolous
to hold in effect that a legislature can legislate by repealing legislation!
1970]
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The cases are legion in denying a cause of action at common law
against a vendor of intoxicating liquors. However, there were a few
cases i s widely scattered spatially and chronologically, which recognized
a cause of action against the vendor. In retrospect it may be said that
they inaugurated the assault upon the rule. That assault commenced in
earnest in 1958. Since that time there have been numerous decisions
rendered which hold in opposition to the majority rule.
III. THE TREND TOWARD AVAILABILITY OF REMEDY
AGAINST THE VENDOR
A. THE PRE-1958 CASES
Notwithstanding the general rule denying recovery, several courts
early recognized exceptional circumstances in which a vendor might be
liable. A re-occurring situation where recovery was treated more favor-
ably was where the patron was in such a state as to be helpless to protect
himself from his own weaknesses. In McCue v. Klein,'9 the defendant
saloon keepers had made a wager among themselves as to whether the
deceased could drink three pints of whiskey in quick succession. They
knew the patron to be an habitual drunkard, and he was intoxicated at
the time. For his feat the patron was to be paid a dollar. After having
consumed two pints of whiskey, a bystander urged the defendants not
to furnish the patron any more whiskey. This urging was ignored; the
patron imbibed the third pint with immediately fatal results. The de-
fendants were held liable to the deceased patron's widow. In Bissell v.
Starzinger,20 and in Ibach v. Jackson, -2 the courts expressed similar con-
cern, opining that a vendor may be liable in circumstances where he has
furnished intoxicating liquor to an "irresponsible" patron.22
In 1850 the Missouri court found the defendant innkeeper liable for
damages to a slave owner because the defendant had permitted a slave to
become intoxicated, resulting in the slave's death.2 3 And in 1896 the
Tennessee court held that the defendant was liable to the wife of the
deceased where the defendant had repeatedly sold liquor to the deceased
'Skinner v. Hughes, 13 Mo. 440 (1850); McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex. 168 (1883); Riden
v. Grimm Bros., 97 Tenn. 220, 36 S.W. 1097 (1896); Bissell v. Starzinger, 112 Iowa
266, 83 N.W. 1065 (1900) (by implication); Ibach v. Jackson, 148 Ore. 92, 35 P.2d
672 (1934).
'p60 Tex. 168 (1883).
'112 Iowa 266, 83 N.W. 1065 (1900).
a1 48 Ore. 92, 35 P.2d 672 (1934).
"More recently, the principle of a duty owing to the irresponsible patron expressed in
the early cases of MeCue, Bissell, and Ibach, has found further expression. See Pratt
v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940) (defendant held liable having sold liquor
to a known habitual drunkard); Nally v. Blandford, 291 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1956)
(defendant vendor knew vendee would drink quart of liquor without stopping);
Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1, 75 A.L.R.2d 821 (1959) (defendant
sold to a visibly intoxicated minor); Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc.,
413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964) (defendant vendor sold to a visibly intoxicated
vendee).
'Skinner v. Hughes, 13 Mo. 440 (1850).
[Vol. 31
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over the wife's written instructions to the contrary. 24 But aside from
a handful of exceptional cases, there was no common law cause of action
against the vendor of liquor for the sale of intoxicants to a patron who
was injured as a result of his intoxication, nor was there liability to an
innocent third person who was injured by the intoxicated patron.
B. THE RECENT CASES ESTABLISHING A TREND TO REMEDY
Beginning in the year 1958, there has been decided a series of cases
that has come to constitute a trend-setting exception to the traditional
common law position denying recovery. Pennsylvania precipitated the
trend with its landmark decision of Schelin v. Goldberg.25 In Schelin the
court held that an intoxicated patron of a bar who lost an eye in a scuffle
with another patron, had a cause of action where the defendant had
served him liquor in violation of a Pennsylvania statute which made it
unlawful to sell liquor to any person visibly intoxicated. The court con-
cluded that the statute was intended to protect vendees as part of the
public, and that its violation was negligence per se.
In 1959 two leading decisions held for plaintiffs against liquor
vendors. In Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dept. Store,26 the court found
Michigan common law to support plaintiff's cause of action where the
complaint alleged that defendant tavern owners in Illinois had unlawfully
sold intoxicating liquor to two drunken men who crossed into Michigan
where they were involved in a tragic accident resulting in plaintiff's
injuries. The court noted that both Illinois and Michigan had Dram Shop
Acts which would ordinarily permit recovery, but neither of the Acts
applied to the facts of the Waynick case. It was in that vacuum that
the court purported to find a common law cause of action, even though the
court found no Michigan precedent for its holding. It would have been
an anomalous and harsh result had the court denied a cause of action
to the very citizens the Acts were intended to protect where, because
of the unique facts of the case, neither Act applied.2 7
The second of the important cases decided in 1959, and perhaps the
leading minority decision, is the case of Rappaport v. Nichols. 28 The
New Jersey court cited the Schelin and Waynick decisions with approval,
and noted that these decisions are supportable by many analogous tort
situations where liability is imposed upon a defendant whose negligence
concurs with that of another tortfeasor to cause injury to an innocent
'mRiden v. Grimm Bros., 97 Tenn. 220, 36 S.W. 1097 (1896).
'188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958). The court reached its decision permitting
a common law cause of action notwithstanding the fact that an 1854 Pennsylvania
Dram Shop Act had been repealed before the assault on the plaintiff. See Meade v.
Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969), discussed supra in note 17, for a contra
result where a Dram Shop Act had been earlier repealed.
-269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. den. 362 U.S. 903 (1960).
'Comment, Civil Liability Under the Michigan Liquor Control Act, 46 J. UR1AN LAW
87, 90 (1968).
-31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1, 75 A.L.R.2d 821 (1959).
1970]
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third party.29 Having concluded that New Jersey's repeal of her Dram
Shop Act 3 0 left unimpaired the common law principles of tort, a un-
animous court held for a plaintiff injured in an automobile collision in
which the negligent minor and already intoxicated driver of the other
vehicle had been served liquor by the defendants in violation of statute.
The court determined that the statute prohibiting sales of liquor to minors
and intoxicated persons was not to be narrowly construed as protecting
minors and intoxicated persons alone, but rather it was intended for
the protection of the public. Hence its violation might well constitute
common law negligence.3
1
In concluding that the defendants' negligence might have been the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, the court said:
[A] tortfeasor is generally held answerable for the injuries which
result in the ordinary course of events from his negligence and it
is generally sufficient if his negligent conduct was a substantial
factor in bringing about the injuries .... The fact that there were
also intervening causes which were foreseeable or were normal
incidents of the risk created would not relieve the tortfeasor of
liability . . . [If] the defendant tavern keepers unlawfully and
negligently sold alcoholic beverages to Nichols causing his intoxi-
cation, which in turn caused or contributed to his negligent operation
of the motor vehicle at the time of the fatal accident, then a jury
could reasonably find the plaintiff's injuries resulted in the ordinary
course of events from the defendants' negligence and that such
negligence was, in fact, a substantial factor in bringing them about.
And a jury could reasonably find that . . . [vendee's acts were]
a normal incident of the risk they created, or an event which they
could reasonably have foreseen, and that consequently there was
no effective breach in the chain of causation."
Since the decision in Rappaport, there has been a steady erosion of
the rule denying liability. Some jurisdictions have indicated that in
the proper circumstances they will adopt the minority rule, and others
'The court discussed several cases where the defendants had unlawfully provided
minors with firearms or ammunition, noting that when the minor negligently injured
an innocent third party the minor's negligent act would not constitute a superseding
intervening cause. Similarly in those cases where the operator of an automobile left
the key in the ignition in violation of statute, a thief's stealing the vehicle and
negligently injuring a third person, would not constitute a superseding intervening
act. The party who initially violated the statute created the risk of injury to the
innocent third party, and it was "fairer to hold him responsible for the harm than
to deny a remedy to the innocent victim." 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1, 7, 75 A.L.R.2d 821,
828, 829 (1959). See also note 38, infra.
'IN. J. SESSION LAWS, 1921, ch. 103, which was repealed by N. J. SEssioN LAWS, 1934,
ch. 32.
"PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 35 at 191 (3d ed. 1964), states:
The standard of conduct required of a reasonable man may be prescribed by
legislative enactment. When a statute provides that under certain circum-
stances particular acts shall or shall not be done, it may be interpreted as
fixing a standard for all members of the community, from which it is negli-
gence to deviate. [Citations omitted.]
Negligence is the breach of legal duty. It is immaterial whether the duty
is one imposed by the rule of common law requiring the exercise of ordinary
care not to injure another, or is imposed by a statute designed for the pro-
tection of others. Id., n. 85 quoting Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103,
105, 41 N.W. 543, 544 (1889).
"Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1, 9, 75 A.L.R.2d 821, 831.
[ Vol. 31
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have explicitly done so. In 1962 the Colorado court dismissed a complaint
where the tavern owner was alleged to have violated a statute forbidding
the sale or gift of liquor to minors, intoxicated persons, or habitual
drunkards.33 The court held that the statute was penal and its violation
could not be made the basis of negligence per se, but the court indicated
that a complaint based on common law principles would state a good cause
of action.
3 4
In 1963 the Florida Supreme Court permitted a recovery by a parent
for his son's death.3 5 Where defendant violated a statute proscribing
sale to minors, it was held to be negligence per se to sell whiskey to
plaintiff's sixteen-year-old son where his age could readily have been
ascertained and he was sitting in an automobile at the time of sale. In
1964 in the case of Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc.,36 the
Pennsylvania court granted recovery to a pedestrian plaintiff against
defendant tavern which had served intoxicants to an inebriated patron who
in his automobile subsequently collided with the plaintiff.37  The same
year a Tennessee appellate court stated that in some circumstances a sale
of intoxicating liquor may constitute negligence, and the sale rather than
the consumption may be the proximate cause of injury.3 8 Thus the court
indicated its acknowledgment of a cause of action at common law against
a liquor vendor.
In 1965 a rash of decisions were rendered modifying and eroding
the majority rule. Pennsylania permitted recovery to a patron who had
been confined in a men's room after he had become intoxicated at de-
fendant's establishment, where plaintiff crawled out a window and fell
'Hull v. Rund, 150 Colo. 425, 374 P.2d 351 (1962).
"Id. at 427-28, 374 P.2d at 352.
'Davis v. Schiappacossee, 155 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1963). But see Reed v. Black Caesar's
Forge Gourmet Restaurant, Inc.., 165 So.2d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (court
refused recovery to plaintiff for death of her husband resulting from liquor served
him while he was intoxicated).
3413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964).
'The court felt rather intensely about the duty owed society regarding the intoxicated
driver. It said:
An intoxicated person behind the wheel of an automobile can be as dan-
gerous as an insane person with a firearm. He is as much a hazard to the
safety of the community as a stick of dynamite that must be defused in order
to be rendered harmless. To serve an intoxicated person more liquor is to
light the fuse. Id. at 631, 632, 198 A.2d at 55.81Mitchell v. Ketner, 393 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964) cert. den., Tenn. Sup. Ct.,
(1965). Although refusing to hold the defendant vendor liable on the facts of the
case, the court stated:
We are unwilling to hold that, no matter what the circumstances, the act
of the purchaser and not the sale constitutes the proximate cause of the injury
to third persons or that consumption of the intoxicant is always an independ-
ent, intervening act which breaks the chain of causation. . . . We can see
little difference in principle between the act of an owner entrusting an auto-
mobile to one known to be an habitual drunkard and the act of a tavern
keeper in plying the driver of a car with intoxicants knowing that he is likely
to drive upon the public highway where he will become a menace to third
persons. Id. at 759.
19701
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some forty feet to a rooftop. 9 In Ramsey v. Anctil,40 the New Hampshire
court held that one might maintain a common law cause of action for
injuries resulting from being served additional liquor while intoxicated,
by defendant liquor licensee in violation of statute. A New York court
indicated its support of the minority rule in Berkeley v. Park.4 It referred
to the decisions of Waynick42 and Rappaport,48 and indicated its approval
of the position allowing recovery stated in those cases.
In the 1966 case of Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn,44 the New Jersey
Supreme Court reaffirmed its Rappaport decision. The court held that a
complaint stated a cause of action where it alleged a fatal fall in a
tavern, which fall was allegedly proximately caused by patron's having
been served liquor by defendant while patron was already in an "apparent
and actual" state of intoxication. The Indiana court in Elder v. Fisher,45
indicated its approval of the minority rule in permitting a cause of
action in favor of a third party injured as a result of the sale of intox-
icating liquor to a minor. Massachusetts recently permitted recovery in
Adamiam v. Three Sons, Inc., 46 where the defendant had illegally sold
liquor to a person obviously intoxicated. Discussing proximate cause, the
court concluded: "Henceforth in this Commonwealth waste of human
life due to drunken driving on the highways will not be left outside the
scope of the foreseeable risk created by the sale of liquor to an already
intoxicated individual." '47 And finally, by a decision in federal district
court, Montana has joined the growing number of jurisdictions that per-
mit a common law recovery against a liquor vendor whose negligent act
of furnishing intoxicating liquor to a patron has proximately caused in-
jury to a third person. 48
IV. DEEDS DISCUSSED
The courts which deny a remedy against the liquor vendor, usually do
so on either the theory that the vendor was not negligent, or that the sale
was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. In holding for the
plaintiff, Judge Jameson found both that defendant was negligent, and
$'Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, Inc., 416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965).
4106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965). Plaintiff had become highly intoxicated and
was oblivious to a glass on the counter which he shattered with his hand, severing a
nerve.
"47 Misc.2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1965). Although New York has a Dram
Shop Act, N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 11-101, the complaint prayed for damages
both under the Dram Shop Act and common law.
-269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. den. 362 U.S. 903 (1960).
-31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1, 75 A.L.R.2d 821.
"146 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966).
"247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966). Defendant sold liquor to a minor in violation
of statute. The minor became intoxicated, and negligently drove an automobile re-
sulting in an accident injuring plaintiff's ward.
"Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968).
"Id. at 233 N.E.2d 20.
"Deeds, supra note 1.
[Vol. 31
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that its sale was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Both
findings are supportable in terms of Montana precedent, and general
tort theory.
By statute 49 Montana prohibits the sale or furnishing of intoxicating
liquor, beer, or wine to a minor or any intoxicated person. The defendant
in Deeds concedes that Tanberg was served intoxicating liquor by its
agents and the court found that at the time of the serving Tanberg was
both a minor and had been drinking to excess. The defendant's bartender
agents were well aware" ° of both of these facts. Having found the statute
violated, the court found the violation to be negligence per se.51 This
was a proper finding 52 in that the statute in question was "enacted by
the legislature for the protection, health, welfare and safety of the
people of the state. "3
A more difficult problem was posed by the question of whether the
defendant's sale was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
What is or is not proximate cause turns "upon conclusions in terms of
legal policy, so that this becomes essentially a question of whether the
policy of the law will extend the responsibility for the conduct to the
consequences which have in fact occurred. "54 That is, as applied to the
facts of the Deeds case, should the defendant who made unlawful sales
'"R.C.M.1947 § 4-413. It reads in pertinent part:
No licensee or his or her employee or employees, nor any other person,
shall sell, deliver, or give away or cause or permit to be sold, delivered or
given away any liquor, beer or wine to:
1. Any person under the age of twenty-one (21) years.
2. Any intoxicated person or any person actually, apparently or obviously
intoxicated.
'Deeds at 353. Intent on the part of the vendor-violator is irrelevant to determine
whether there has been a culpable breach of the law under § 4-413. In State v. Er-
landson, 126 Mont. 316, 322, 249 P.2d 794, 797 (1952), the court said:
The acts [Montana Beer Act and the Montana Retail Liquor License Act]
are police regulations enacted pursuant to the police power of the state ...
The acts and deeds therein condemned and prohibited [i.e., the sale of in-
toxicating liquor to minors or intoxicated persons] are mala prohibita as dis-
tingulshed from acts nala in se. As to act mala in se the intent governs
but as to those mala prohibita the only inquiry is: Has the law been violated?
'Deeds at 359.
"Daly v. Swift & Co., 90 Mont. 52, 300 P. 265 (1931); Burns v. Fisher, 132 Mont. 26,
313 P.2d 1044, 67 A.L.R.2d 1 (1957); Williams v. Maley, 150 Mont. 261, 434 P.2d
398 (1967). For additional citations, see Deeds at 359.
-R.C.M.1947 § 4-401. Prosser puts it well:
Once the statute is determined to be applicable-which is to say, once it
is interpreted as designed to protect the class of persons in which the plaintiff
is included, against the risk of harm which has in fact occurred as a result
of its violation-the great majority of the courts hold that an unexcused vio-
lation is conclusive on the issue of negligence. . . . [T]he unexcused violation
is negligence "per se.'" PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 35 at
202 (3d ed. 1964).
The plaintiff in this case was within the class of persons protected, i.e., a "person
of Montana;" and it requires no stretch of imagination to interpret the statute (in
light of the extensive use made of automobiles today, and their frequent negligent
operation by intoxicated persons resulting in serious injury) as designed to protect
against the type of harm that befell the plaintiff, i.e., personal injury resulting from
an automobile accident.
"PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW Or TOaTS, § 49 at 282 (3d ed. 1964).
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of intoxicating liquor to an intoxicated minor, be held liable as a policy
of law to a third person who was injured by the intoxicated minor? The
answer, it would seem, is clearly yes. But like most discussions of liability
hinged on a determination of proximate cause, the decision in Deeds was
not simply arrived at. Rather the court pursued a lengthy discussion
of tort principles to arrive at the same answer, i.e., that defendant would
be liable.
For there to be proximate cause, there must be cause in fact. There
is a necessity of a causal relationship between the act complained of and
the injury. Cause in fact is a sine qua non of proximate cause. Further-
more, the injury must flow from the act complained of in a natural con-
tinuous sequence. As stated by the Montana Supreme Court: "Proximate
cause is one 'which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any new, independent cause, produced the injury, and without which the
injury would not have occurred." 5  However, the proximate cause need
not be the sole cause, and rarely if ever would it be. There are frequently
intervening causes.
[T]he test is not to be found in the number of intervening events
or agencies, but in their character and in the natural connection
between the wrong done and the injurious consequence, and if such
result is attributable to the original negligence as a result which
might reasonably have been foreseen as probable, the liability
continues.'
Thus, though there intervene other causes, if those intervening causes
were reasonably foreseeable, the defendant's liability will not be super-
seded or terminated. Applying these rules to the facts of Deeds, the
court held that defendant could reasonably foresee that the intoxicated
vendee might negligently drive his automobile injuring someone.5 7 And
when those eventualities in fact occurred, defendant was liable for the
injuries sustained by plaintiff.
The next hurdle the court had to surmount was that the California
Supreme Court on similar facts, had construed the sale of liquor in viola-
tion of an identical statute not to grant a cause of action-for lack of
5Stzaba v. Great Northern Railway Co., 147 Mont. 185, 195, 411 P.2d 379, 385 (1966).
5Mize v. Rocky Mountain Bell Telephone Co., 38 Mont. 521, 532, 100 P. 971, 973 (1909).
"Deeds at 361. The radar base at which the defendant's agents unlawfully served
Tanberg [the driver of the automobile in which plaintiff was riding at the time of
her injuries] was 39 miles from Havre. The Air Force personnel bartenders knew
that the only available transportation back to Havre for the plaintiff and the numer-
our other civilians attending the party at the radar base, was private automobiles.
Judge Jameson stated:
... [I]n my opinion the employees of the United States who sold and
served the liquor to an intoxicated minor, knowing that it would be necessary
for the airmen at the party to return their dates to Havre by private auto-
mobile, could reasonably foresee or anticipate some accident or injury as a
reasonable and natural consequence of their illegal and negligent acts, par-
ticularly in view of the ever increasing incidence of serious automobile acci-
dents resulting from drunken driving. Id.
[Vol. 31
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proximate cause-against the liquor vendor.58 The court recognized that
although the California court's construction was persuasive, it declined to
follow California on the basis that the California decision was incon-
sistent with modern tort theory and Montana law regarding proximate
cause.
59
Perhaps the most assailable portion of the Deeds opinion is Judge
Jameson's discussion of, and conclusion regarding, a 1961 Montana case,
Nevin v. Carlasco.60 The Nevin case raises a problem, because it cites
with apparent approval, Fleckner v. Dionne,6 a California case enunciating
the rule denying a cause of action against the liquor vendor. To find in.
favor of the plaintiff in Deeds, Judge Jameson had to circumvent the
implication that Montana would follow the majority rule.
In the Nevin case, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed a judgment
of non-suit against a patron-plaintiff injured in a fall caused by a push
from a fellow patron. Patron had sued the tavern keeper apparently on
the theory that a tavern keeper owes a duty to protect his patrons. The
Court discussed at some length a tavern keeper's general duty to patrons, 2
and then concluded that this general duty had not been breached.
The Supreme Court then turned to a discussion of plaintiff's reliance
on two Montana statutes, which plaintiff alleged created a duty on the
part of the tavern keeper. The Court said: "If we were to accept this
"The rule in California is well established that it is not the sale but rather the con-
sumption of the intoxicating liquor which is the proximate cause of injury. Lammers
v. Pacific Electric R. Co., 186 Cal. 379, 199 P. 523, 525 (1921); Hitson v. Dwyer, 61
Cal. App.2d 803, 143 P.2d 952, 955 (1943); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App.2d 246, 210
P.2d 530, 534 (1949); Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal.2d 345, 289 P.2d 450, 459, 54 A.L.R.2d
1137 (1955).
"Deeds at 359-61. Whereas the rule of proximate cause in California in situations
like the one at bar is well settled-it is the consumption not the sale which is the
proximate cause-as applied to this fact situation the rule of proximate cause had
not been decided in Montana. Judge Jameson concluded that in the absence of any
controlling authority by the Montana court, the sale of the liquor in violation of the
law was a proximate cause of plaintiff 's injuries. Deeds at 361.
"Nevin v. Carlasco, 139 Mont. 512, 365 P.2d 637 (1961). Judge Jameson's considera-
tion of Nevin is found at page 360 of his opinion. Deeds at 360.
894 Cal. App.2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949).
"139 Mont. 512, 514, 515, 365 P.2d 637, 638 (1961). In discussing the duty of a tavern
keeper to his patron, the court stated:
[W]e find the general rule to be that the duty of a tavern keeper to
protect a patron from injury by another arises only when one or more of
the following circumstances exist:
(1) A tavern keeper allowed a person on the premises who has a known
propensity for fighting.
(2) The tavern keeper allowed a person to remain on the premises whose
conduct had become obstreperous and aggressive to such a degree the
tavern keeper knew or ought to have known he endangered others.
(3) The tavern keeper had been warned of danger from an obstreperous
patron and failed to take suitable measures for the protection of
others.
(4) The tavern keeper failed to stop a fight as soon as possible after it
started.
(5) The tavern keeper failed to provide a staff adequate to police the
premises.
(6) The tavern keeper tolerated disorderly conditions.
None of these duties were violated here. Id. at 514, 515 365 P.2d at 638.
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contention [that the statutes created a duty] the evidence is devoid of
any knowledge on the part of [the tavern keeper] of the violation of any
of these statutes."6 3 Then going on to confuse the holding, the Court
states:
The rule followed by most courts is that when damages arise from
voluntary intoxication, the seller of the intoxicant is not liable in
tort for the reason that his act is not the efficient cause of the
damage. The proximate cause is the act of him who imbibes the
liquor.
The appellant was obliged to prove a set of circumstances which
created a duty to the injured patron and facts that would prove a
breach of that duty. [Citing Fleckner.] Having failed to do so thejudgment of the district court was correct and it is hereby affirmed.'
The Nevin case presents a problem of interpretation. Just what did
the Montana Supreme Court do? The case is sufficiently confused
to render its operative effect subject to at least three plausible inter-
pretations. 1. The Montana Court intended to adopt the majority rule
denying recovery and did so. 2. The Montana Court merely recognized the
majority rule, but indicated that in certain circumstances a common law
cause of action will lie. 3. Regardless of the intent of' the Montana
Court, the Nevin case has no precedental value regarding a common law
cause of action against a liquor vendor who unlawfully dispenses intox-
icants.
The first proposition, a rule denying a cause of action against the
vendor for the unlawful sale of intoxicants, follows from the fact that
the Montana Court cited with apparent approval the California case of
Fleckner v. Dionne, which case denies a cause of action for lack of proxi-
mate cause.6 5  It is this proposition which caused Judge Jameson the
111d. at 515, 365 P.2d at 639.
'Id. at 515, 516, 365 P.2d at 639.
15The argument that the Supreme Court intended to adopt the majority rule as stated
by Fleckner, goes like this: It is true that the question before the Nevin Court was
one of duty [not proximate cause, which was the issue in Fleckner], the duty owing
by a tavern keeper to a patron. This duty arises, if at all, by virtue of the fact
that the plaintiff is a patron. It inures, in the proper circumstances [see the Court's
enumeration, listed in note 62, supra] to a patron whether or not the tavern keeper
has unlawfully sold intoxicants to another patron. It is a duty to patrons only, and
it is similar in nature, though not as extensive in scope, to the duty owed by a com-
mon carrier to a passenger. The breach of this duty results not from an unlawful
sale of intoxicants, but from a failure to protect a patron from injury at the hands
of a fellow patron, whom the tavern keeper knows or should know to be unruly.
The Supreme Court concluded that on the facts alleged in the Nevin case, this
''patron duty" did not exist, although it admitted that in a different set of circum-
stances such a duty might be found. But to determine whether the defective complaint
might be sustained on any basis, the Court turned its attention to another theory
upon which plaintiff might have stated a cause of action. That theory is the one
discussed in Fleckner, i.e., whether the vendor is liable to a third party at common
law for the unlawful sale of intoxicants to a patron who because of his intoxication,
injures the third person. On the basis of Fleckner, the Court concluded that no such
theory was sustainable at common law.
Hence, since the plaintiff in Nevin failed to prove a "patron duty," and since
she could not sustain a cause of action on the theory of the Fleckner case, she was
non-suited.
Viewing the Nevin decision in this way, notwithstanding the fact that the ques-
tion in Nevin was one of duty and not proximate cause, the Court's reference to
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difficulty, for if this view were adopted, he would have been precluded
from finding a cause of action in the Deeds case.
Judge Jameson, however, interpreted the Court to have adopted the
second proposition. He quoted the language from Nevin set out above as
text accompanying footnote 64, and then concluded:
The reference to Fleckner v. Dionne, supra, might indicate that
Montana would follow California in holding that the furnishing of
liquor was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. On the
other hand, the court indicates also that there might be a "set
of circumstances" which would create a duty to an injured person.
The Montana court did not of course consider the question here
presented or the cases permitting recovery, most of which have
been decided since 1961."
Apparently Judge Jameson's reasoning is that although the Montana
Court has adopted the majority rule denying recovery against the liquor
vendor, that adoption was qualified. He interpreted the Montana Court
to be saying that on the facts of Nevin there was no cause of action,
nor is there usually in such cases as is expressed by Fleckner, but on
certain facts [given the proper "set of circumstances"] there would be
a cause of action. With that interpretation of Nevin, Judge Jameson
goes on to conclude that the facts of Deeds fall within the exception
created by the Montana Court.
It may be that the Judge is correct in his interpretation. However,
it seems most reasonable that the Montana Court's reference to "set of
circumstances" has nothing to do with proximate cause nor cause of action
based on unlawful sale. The question before the Court in Nevin was one
of duty, and the Court merely indicated that on certain facts a patron
might prove a duty owed to himself as a patron.6 7 Duty and proximate
cause are not equivalents. Therefore, Judge Jameson's conclusion seems
not to follow.68 For in spite of the fact that the Montana Court might
in given circumstances find a duty to an injured party, that would not
permit it to sustain a cause of action against a vendor if in fact Mon-
tana "would follow California in holding that the furnishing of liquor
was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries."69 The Court would
have to find not only duty, but also proximate cause.
Notwithstanding the difficulty of the language in Nevin, there is
a relatively simple basis for determining that the Montana Supreme Court
has not precluded a copnmon law cause of action as was done in Deeds.
The very basis of the common law liability which is the subject of this
Note, is an unlawful sale or some other wrongful furnishing. Yet in the
"Deeds at 360.
'For an explanation of this "patron duty," see note 65 supra.
"Note that the Montana Court stated that there might be a ''set of circumstances
which [would create] a duty." Had the Court said there might be a "set of circum-
stances which [would create] a proximate cause," then Judge Jameson's conclusion
would be more defensible.
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Nevin case, the Montana Court stated that "there was no evidence adduced
showing that the [defendant liquor vendor] had served . . . any intox-
icating liquor"7 0 to the patron who injured the plaintiff. In fact, plain-
tiff herself testified that she did not see the defendant tavern keeper
serve liquor to the party who caused her injuries.71 Since the necessary
act of some wrongful sale or furnishing was not substantiated, the Court
has said nothing which will serve as precedent in regard to a cause of
action based on an unlawful sale of liquor. The question of tavern keepers'
common law liability for an unlawful sale of intoxicants was not properly
before the Montana Court. Hence, in the absence of Montana law on the
subject, Judge Jameson was at liberty to adopt the minority rule per-
mitting a common law cause of action. Furthermore, in light of policy,
Montana law on proximate cause, and the trend toward allowing a
remedy,72 it seems a cogent argument might be made that when the Mon-
tana Court does consider the question, it will opt in favor of the minority
rule.
Having once decided that there is a common law action in favor of
the injured party against a vendor of intoxicating liquor who unlawfully
sells or furnishes intoxicants to a patron who either injures himself or
another, the question then remains as to what may constitute defenses.
Of course if any element of those four 73 necessary to sustain a cause of
action in negligence is not present, no cause of action can be maintained.
In fact it would seem that any defense to an ordinary negligence tort
action that would be good in another circumstance, would be good in an
action of the type being discussed. But some courts have created an
exception. They have declined to allow the defendant-vendor to avoid
liability by pleading contributory negligence. For example, in Soronell
v. Olde Milford Inn, 74 the court indicated that contributory negligence
was not a defense to a suit for wrongful death following the deceased's
fatal fall in a tavern which fall was the alleged result of deceased having
been served liquor while he was then in an actual and apparent state
of intoxication. Nor could defendant avoid liability on theory of con-
tributory negligence where defendant's patron arrived sober and be-
came intoxicated on the premises before falling some forty feet, where
defendant violated a statute making it unlawful to sell or furnish intox-
icating liquor to any person visibly intoxicated. 75  But a contrary
approach was taken in Ramsey v. Anctil.76 Contributory negligence was
70139 Mont. 512, 513, 365 P.2d 637 (1961).
ld.
71See supra, III. THE TREND TOWARD AVAILABILITY OF REMEDY AGAINST
VENDOR.
7 Duty, negligence, proximate cause, and damages are the four elements that must be
proven in every successful negligence action.
7146 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966).
"Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, Inc., 416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965).
7106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965).
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held to be a defense to a common law action for injuries received as a
result of being served additional liquor, while intoxicated, by the
vendor.
The best that can be said is that there is a split of authority on
this point. The question was not conclusively answered in Deeds, as the
Court found that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent, nor had
she assumed the risk.77
V. CONCLUSION
Although the traditional common law rule is one denying the liability
of a liquor vendor who unlawfully sells intoxicating liquor to a patron
causing injury to the patron or a third person, recent cases have established
a trend which permits a cause of action against the vendor. It is a favor-
able development.
Particularly in the situation as typified by the Deeds case, the
traditional objection to a finding of liability-lack of proximate cause-
is untenable. Today with the literally millions of private automobiles
on our highways, and with the thousands of people killed every year by
intoxicated operators, it is not at all unforeseeable that when a vendor
plys a patron with liquor to the point of obvious intoxication, or where
he furnishes a minor with intoxicants, that a serious automobile accident
may ensue. To permit a cause of action on such facts is entirely consis-
tent with recognized tort principles. It has the benefit of shifting the
loss from an often entirely innocent third party to the liquor business.
It provides a remedy where there otherwise may be none because the intox-
icated driver may be judgment proof. Yet according such a remedy will
not subject liquor vendors to ruinous liability because they have the
power to prevent such liability. They need merely refrain from making
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